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Foreword
HONORABLE STANLEY MARCUS
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
I am delighted that the University of Miami Law Review has
devoted-and intends to devote each year-an entire issue to the work
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The
benefits of subjecting the work of the federal circuit courts of appeals to
the criticism and insights of the scholarly community are obvious and
substantial. For one thing, the overwhelming majority of federal appeals
are finally adjudicated in the circuit courts. Indeed, it is not too much to
say that the courts of appeals represent the last stop on the train for
virtually all federal litigants. Last year, for instance, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari review on only a handful of the more than 7500
appeals terminated by the Eleventh Circuit. Needless to say, arriving at
the right answer, and explaining our rulings with clarity and simplicity,
are of paramount significance. I welcome the Review's efforts to help
ensure that we do just that.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was
created by an Act of Congress in 1981. The Act carved our court out of
the historic Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,' perhaps best-known for its
fight against entrenched racial segregation in the South. Today, this Cir-
cuit stands as one of the busiest and most diverse appellate courts in the
nation. Ranging from rural Georgia and the coal mines of Alabama to
the large metropolitan centers of Atlanta and Miami, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit encompasses some thirty-two million people and the broadest range
of racial, religious, and ethnic communities. Not surprisingly, the vol-
ume and nature of our work reflect the explosive growth of our popula-
tion and the extraordinary diversity of our people.
This maiden issue of the Eleventh Circuit Review features several
1. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat.
1994.
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timely articles in the fields of criminal and immigration law, subjects of
great significance to the work of our court. In fact, over the past few
years we have witnessed profound changes in the framework that gov-
erns both.
The nature and scope of criminal sentencing in the United States
has undergone radical transformation since the earliest days of the
Republic, when a fixed term of imprisonment for each offense was
strictly prescribed by the legislature, denuding the trial courts of virtu-
ally all sentencing discretion. Some time later, a little over a century
ago, the penological theories that formed the foundation for our sentenc-
ing regime changed significantly, focusing for the first time on the
potential for rehabilitation, rather than just on retribution or incapacita-
tion. A new system of indeterminate sentencing developed, conferring
largely unfettered discretion on federal district judges to sentence
defendants within a broadly defined range, subject only to the most min-
imal form of appellate review.
Serious disparities, however, among the sentences of similarly situ-
ated defendants were thought a commonplace and deleterious result of
this regime, and the notion of rehabilitation as an attainable object of
sentencing policy fell into disrepute. Not surprisingly, in 1987 Congress
discarded this system of virtually unreviewable sentencing discretion in
favor of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which set forth a
mandatory sentencing range determined largely by the nature of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.2 As is evi-
dent from the text of the Sentencing Reform Act, the Guidelines sought
to eliminate "unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct
"13
Eighteen years later, however, in United States v. Booker and
United States v. Fanfan,4 the Supreme Court declared the Guidelines
unconstitutional to the extent they required a trial judge to enhance a
defendant's sentence on the basis of facts not found by a jury. To rem-
edy the constitutional violation, the Court, in a separate opinion, struck
down a portion of the statute that rendered the Guidelines mandatory,
and subjected the ensuing sentences to "reasonableness" review by
appellate courts. In the aftermath of Booker, Rita v. United States, 5 Gall
2. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000).
4. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
5. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
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v. United States,6 and Kimbrough v. United States,7 the circuit courts of
appeals have struggled to discern and define the more circumscribed
dimensions of appellate review.8 Lindsay Harrison's article on appellate
court discretion and sentencing after Booker, therefore, could not be
more timely.9
Beyond the examination of federal criminal sentencing, the Review
contains several informative articles on other hot-button issues regularly
appearing before our court. Professor Ricardo J. Bascuas, for one, criti-
cizes this Circuit's approach to the procedures governing the pretrial for-
feiture of assets in criminal cases.'" He argues that, rather than relying
on a grand jury's finding of probable cause to sustain pretrial asset for-
feitures, the Fourth Amendment requires-or, at least, should require-
an adversarial pretrial hearing as a necessary predicate to any forfeiture.
Moreover, in the timely and rapidly evolving area of immigration
law-a field receiving substantially more attention from the courts of
appeals-Tania Galloni suggests that appellate judges ought to proscribe
the Board of Immigration Appeals from denying asylum claims solely
on the basis of immaterial or extraneous inconsistencies in a petitioner's
testimony before the Immigration Judge." Michael Vastine, in still
another immigration law article, observes that too often asylum seekers
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims neglect to present ade-
quately the merits of their asylum claims, without which they cannot
begin to establish that they were prejudiced by palpably unreasonable
attorney conduct.' 2 Finally, Rebecca Sharpless addresses the frequently
recurring question of how an Immigration Judge may utilize an alien's
prior criminal conviction as a foundation for deportation.' 3
Those who wield the enormous power of the state must be watched.
And judges are no exception. Circuit judges work almost exclusively on
the basis of written opinions in which we provide detailed and, hope-
fully, well-reasoned justifications for our decisions. By compiling and
outlining much-needed legal, historical, and statistical analyses, quality
6. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
7. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
8. See generally United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11 th Cir. 2008).
9. See Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker, 62 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1115 (2008).
10. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Of Defense Lawyers and Pornographers: Pretrial Asset Seizures
and the Fourth Amendment, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1159 (2008).
11. See Tania Galloni, Keeping It Real: Judicial Review of Asylum Credibility Determinations
in the Eleventh Circuit After the REAL ID Act, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1037 (2008).
12. See Michael S. Vastine, Is Your Client Prejudiced? Litigating Ineffective-Assistance-of-
Counsel Claims of Immigration Matters Arising in the Eleventh Circuit, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1063 (2008).
13. See Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical
Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (2008).
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legal scholarship is peculiarly important to that process. I look forward
to the Review's continued exploration of these and other timely topics. I
have no doubt that our Court and future litigants will be the better for it.
